In the line of fire: what's left of Iran's nuclear program

In June of this year, Iran's nuclear program suddenly turned from a subject of diplomatic disputes and economic sanctions into a target of missile strikes. On June 13, Israel attacked key Iranian nuclear facilities, and on the night of June 22, the United States joined the operation. The airstrikes were the first time Iran's nuclear infrastructure has been hit. Maxim Starchak, a researcher at the Center for International and Defense Policy at Queens University, examined whether the Islamic Republic's nuclear program has been eliminated.

On December 8, 1953, U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower delivered his famous «Atoms for Peace» speech at the UN General Assembly. This marked the beginning of the program of the same name, under which 30 countries, including Iran, later gained access to nuclear research for civilian needs to a greater or lesser extent;

Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi was in power in Iran at the time. He set the goal of modernizing the country, and the development of nuclear energy and the right to enrich uranium was in line with this goal. In 1957, Iran and the U.S. signed an agreement to cooperate on civilian atoms. Two years later, the Nuclear Research Center opened at the University of Tehran;

In 1967, the U.S. supplied Iran with a 5-megawatt nuclear research reactor with highly enriched uranium. After 12 years, Pahlavi was overthrown and the new authorities declared Iran an Islamic republic. But it retained the technologies it had received from the United States. They enabled it to develop its nuclear program more broadly than Tehran had originally negotiated with Washington. Although initially the new leadership believed that the development of nuclear energy made Iran dependent on Western technology and scrapped the previous government's ambitious program to build 23 reactors.

In the 1990s, Iran restarted its nuclear program, openly seeking to build a civilian nuclear reactor but secretly developing uranium enrichment technology;

The issue of Iran's nuclear program came to a head in 2002 when Iranian opposition activists disclosed two secret nuclear facilities for uranium enrichment at Natanz and Arak. An IAEA investigation subsequently uncovered evidence that Iran had conducted a series of activities related to nuclear weapons development from the late 1980s through 2003. 

In 2003, Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei issued a fatwa banning the development of nuclear weapons. However, as early as 2005, the IAEA stated that Iran was violating the terms of its safeguards agreement, which provides for transparency and monitoring of nuclear facilities, and was not allowing inspectors into its nuclear facilities. At this time, Iran is also actively increasing ballistic missile production. 

Thereafter, Iran was only balancing between nuclear weapons development and diplomacy, so that it would not prevent it from building up its technological base in this sphere and creating an image of a country that complies with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The 2015 agreement on Iran's nuclear program between Tehran and the «six» Western countries (the US, UK, France, Russia, China and Germany) reassured the international community. Iran then agreed to limit its nuclear program in exchange for a partial lifting of international sanctions;

But the U.S. then began claiming that Iran was secretly continuing to develop its weapons program. The states eventually withdrew from the agreement in 2018. Iran, on the other hand, continued open enrichment of uranium, approaching weapons-grade levels;

Over the past six months, the amount of uranium produced in Iran, enriched to 60%, has increased 2.3 times to 408 kilograms. This is enough to build several nuclear warheads;

The primary target for civilian uranium enrichment is the 3.67% level that is standard for nuclear reactors.

Iran's increase of uranium enrichment to 60% without clear explanation and increasing the amount of uranium enrichment has raised many questions. Enrichment up to 60% has no basis for civilian needs and indicates potential military intentions;

Calculations by U.S. physicists show that given the sophistication of Iranian centrifuges, Tehran could enrich uranium to weapons-grade levels of 90% in a matter of weeks;

Israel felt that there was not much time left to solve Iran's nuclear problem. As a result, on June 13, 2025, the Israel Defense Forces attacked the country's nuclear facilities. The operation covered uranium enrichment plants in Natanz and Fordow, as well as other facilities related to the nuclear program and military activities;

But Israel could not destroy Iran's underground nuclear facilities. In the end, the U.S. stepped in and struck three sites. «We have successfully completed the attack on three nuclear sites in Iran - Fordow, Natanz and Isfahan. All aircraft have left Iranian airspace. A full complement of bombs was dropped on the main site, Fordo,» U.S. President Donald Trump announced on the night of June 22.

U.S. B-2 bombers used GBU-57 mega-bombs to destroy fortified underground factories. This is where the centrifuge cascades were located, which Iran could easily use to increase enrichment from 60% to 90% for weapons-grade uranium. Satellite imagery showing bomb craters, blocked tunnel entrances, and surface damage confirms significant infrastructure destruction;

There is still no clear answer to this question. President Trump, for example, claims that irreparable damage has been done to Iran's nuclear program;

But CBS U.S. intelligence sources report that it is «low confidence» that Iran's nuclear program has been set back a few months, but not completely destroyed. 

Israel, for its part, declared that the damage was severe, but it was still looking into the matter. 

Tehran, on the other hand, claims to have removed its stockpile of enriched uranium days before the strikes. The satellites of the US company Maxar Technologies indeed  recorded the movement of trucks in the Fordow area a few days before the strike;

In addition, the IAEA has not been able to monitor or verify centrifuge production since the beginning of 2021. Consequently, we do not know how many centrifuges Iran has or where they are located;

If Iran retained its stockpile of enriched uranium, I estimate that it would need about 1,000 modern centrifuges to produce weapons-grade uranium from 60% to 90%;

It was relatively easy for Iran to get them, as it could produce at least 1,500-2,000 centrifuges per year;

It is likely that Iran has an alternative, as yet unidentified, uranium enrichment facility where production could be restored. Given that the uranium enrichment plants at Natanz and Fordow were built in secret and remained undisclosed for 6-7 years, the possibility of other such facilities cannot be ruled out;

Theoretically, such a plant could already be operational, giving Iran the ability to produce highly enriched uranium. However, this is only enriching uranium to weapons grade. Then it is necessary to prepare uranium for use in weapons components, to develop explosives, detonators, and warheads. So far Iran has not managed to achieve this;

Further development of the nuclear program will depend on Iran's willingness to revive its nuclear program under the risk of new missile strikes. Tehran may refuse to do so in response to security assurances and sanctions relief.

But another option cannot be ruled out: if Iran has retained sufficient stockpiles of enriched uranium and has other hidden nuclear facilities, it could accelerate the development of nuclear weapons. Iran may believe that only nuclear weapons can guarantee its defense against future attacks and openly withdraw from the NPT. This would be perceived as a declaration of a move toward nuclear weapons;

The creation of nuclear weapons by Iran would threaten not only Israel but also other countries in the Middle East;

Such strengthening of Iran is not beneficial to neighboring countries. Tehran has territorial disputes with a number of them, for example, with OAE. 

This situation may encourage other states in the region to develop their own nuclear weapons. After all, the development of nuclear weapons by Iran can clearly demonstrate that it is possible to implement a military nuclear program even under sanctions and missile attacks.

However, Israel is willing to pay a heavy price to eliminate Iran's nuclear capabilities. This means that if the republic retains its nuclear program or tries to revive it, future strikes on its territory will be obviously predictable. The fear of attacks on Iranian nuclear facilities is gone. This has significantly delayed the development of Tehran's nuclear program. 

Israel understands that Iran is using diplomacy to achieve economic interests, and this has no bearing on the development of a nuclear program. North Korea has also been playing diplomacy while simultaneously developing its nuclear missile forces. 

Israel shows that it is possible to preserve the nuclear non-proliferation regime by force. On the one hand, this is a good thing. On the other hand, it can have a negative effect, as the current or future nuclear programs of other states may be in the crosshairs of neighbors who would find such a development dangerous;

Military methods of solving the nuclear non-proliferation problem could become a dangerous example and destabilize the situation in other regions of the world where nuclear technology is or will be developed.

This article was AI-translated and verified by a human editor