Market Revival or Utopia: What Will Bond Guarantees Lead to in Kazakhstan?

Kazakhstan is trying to reduce the risks for investors in Kazakh bonds by adopting a guarantee mechanism similar to the one used by the Asian Development Bank / Photo: CGIF
A Bond Guarantee Fund may be established in Kazakhstan. This was announced by Madina Abylkasymova, Chair of the Agency for the Regulation and Development of the Financial Market, during a meeting with Inmin Yang, Vice President of the Asian Development Bank. In a column for Oninvest, Vladimir Savenok— director of the consulting firm LC Finance and author of more than ten books on investment mechanisms—discusses the implications of establishing a guarantee mechanism in the stock market.
It appears that the fund will be similar to the Credit Guarantee and Investment Facility (CGIF). This fund was established by the ASEAN+3 countries (the 10 ASEAN nations, China, Japan, and South Korea) in collaboration with the Asian Development Bank. The main objective of this fund is to enable creditworthy corporations to secure long-term financing in local currencies.
Why is such a fund needed in Kazakhstan?
Essentially, the Bond Guarantee Fund is a carbon copy of the already familiar Deposit Guarantee Fund. Its main and only goal is to attract public funds to the debt market.
Today, this market in Kazakhstan suffers from low liquidity: In the first 10 months of 2026, out of a total trading volume of 6.42 trillion tenge in corporate bonds on the KASE, 83.1% came from initial public offerings and only 16.9% from the secondary market. Securities from reliable issuers are mainly snapped up by large players during the initial public offering stage (individual investors account for only 1.2% of that volume), while the secondary market remains sluggish with minimal trading volumes. At the same time, high-yield and risky bonds (such as those issued by microfinance organizations) trade much more actively—on the secondary market, the share of retail investors increases more than 11-fold, reaching 13.9% of trading volume.
The reason for this imbalance lies in the rates of return. Safe bonds offer lower rates than bank deposits—while issues from the Ministry of Finance, state-owned companies, and major banks yield an average of 13–15% per year, while rates on tenge deposits (especially savings accounts) reach 15.5–17% GESV. Bonds are profitable over the long term during periods when the National Bank’s base rate is falling, but retail investors are unwilling to wait. Acting on the principle that “a bird in the hand is worth two in the bush,” they opt for a simpler, more straightforward, and more profitable instrument—a standard bank deposit.
To which securities will the protection apply?
The mechanism by which the future fund will operate has not yet been disclosed, but logic suggests two scenarios, both of which are dead ends:
• Scenario 1. Guarantees only for reliable issuers (similar to the Asian fund). Most likely, the securities of large banks and corporations will be covered by the protection.
But these securities are of little interest to retail investors anyway, due to their low yields. Moreover, the reliability of these issuers is, in itself, a sufficient guarantee—they don’t need any additional protection.
• Scenario 2. Guarantees for high-yield bonds. If the fund starts insuring risky securities (such as those issued by MFOs), a flood of money will pour into the market—I myself would gladly buy MFO bonds backed by a government guarantee. However, such a scenario is completely unrealistic: for the fund, it would be a sure path to bankruptcy.
False Advantages
The only potential benefit of the initiative is an influx of fresh liquidity. The phrase “government guarantee” could indeed encourage some citizens to buy bonds. But this will only work for risky, high-yield securities; it will not increase demand for low-yield “blue-chip” bonds.
Moreover, I cannot say that this idea is beneficial for the development of financial literacy. By guaranteeing a return on investment, the government discourages citizens from learning about the market, analyzing financial statements, and assessing risks.
Why bother understanding an issuer’s business if the government is going to cover the losses anyway? Following this logic, the next step could be the creation of a “Stock Guarantee Fund.”
Key Risks
The risks to the government and the fund itself are obvious:
• With a conservative approach (investing only in reliable securities), the risks are minimal, but the fund offers no added value—its guarantees simply mirror the reliability of the issuers themselves.
• With broad coverage (insuring all securities indiscriminately), the risks become critical. After just the first wave of defaults among weak issuers, the fund will simply be unable to meet its payment obligations and will be liquidated.
Summary
The fund will be able to guarantee only bonds from reliable issuers; otherwise, it will quickly go bankrupt.
Securities issued by reliable issuers do not require artificial crutches in the form of additional guarantees.
The presence of a guarantee will not make bonds from reliable issuers more attractive than bank deposits.
Launching the fund will only result in the creation of yet another bureaucratic government agency with unclear effectiveness.
My opinion: The idea of creating a Bond Guarantee Fund will never get past the discussion stage. It makes no economic sense, so it will never actually be implemented.
This article was AI-translated and verified by a human editor



