An Angry France: What Surprises Might Lie Ahead in the Upcoming Presidential Election?

In April 2027, France—which is grappling with debt and budget crises—will hold presidential elections. So far, candidates from the far right and far left have emerged as frontrunners in the race. They are the ones making the right promises to disgruntled French voters. However, this by no means rules out unexpected twists in the future. Political commentator Sergey Mikhailov discusses the obvious and hidden favorites in the race for the Élysée Palace.

The first round of the presidential election in France is scheduled for April 18, 2027. And, as is typical for this kind of election, by the end of October the campaign should already be in full swing and, of course, have identified—albeit tentatively—the frontrunners and underdogs. At the same time, everyone understands that the main events are still to come.

Public opinion poll data is released every week; the polls are conducted by various polling organizations.

Over the past two months, the balance of power in the first round of the election has remained as follows: Marine Le Pen, one of the leaders of the National Rally party, is in the lead by a wide margin, with 30 to 35 percent of voters ready to cast their ballots for her. She is considered to be on the far right, although in recent years she has made considerable efforts to improve her image and avoid scaring off moderate voters.

According to the polls, none of her rivals in the presidential race is polling at more than 20 percent. A fierce competition is now emerging among them for the chance to advance to the second round and challenge the frontrunner there.

In second place is Jean-Luc Mélenchon, leader of the far-left party “Unbowed France,” who, unlike Marine Le Pen, fully lives up to the stereotype associated with him. In previous elections, he consistently garnered around 20% of the vote, which represents both his electoral ceiling and a reliable level of support.

Next are Horizons party leader Édouard Philippe and Raphaël Glucksmann, who won the Social Democratic camp’s primary. Even if they trail Mélenchon, the gap is within the margin of error.

Rounding out the top five is Gabriel Attal, secretary-general of the “Renaissance” party.

Candidates who are catching up to Le Pen and Mélenchon need to significantly ramp up their campaigns in the near future or consider forming an alliance with one of the stronger contenders.

Compared to the 2017 election—the last one in which incumbent President Emmanuel Macron ran—back in October 2016, no one could have predicted his victory.

Everyone was awaiting the results of the Republican primaries, which François Fillon ultimately won. He appeared to be the frontrunner for the top job at the Élysée Palace until a scandal erupted in January 2017, which buried his political career and paved the way for Emmanuel Macron’s success. Journalists reported at the time that Fillon ’s wife and children were receiving salaries from public funds as parliamentary aides.

What does this story teach us? Its main lesson is that current candidate poll numbers can be viewed as initial indicators, but it would be a mistake to overestimate their significance.

The main protagonist of the new election campaign is the angry French voter. And right now, he’s very angry.

Many French people feel as though their lives have reached a dead end: inflation is rising faster than incomes, gas prices are at record highs, there are problems in the education system, and social services are deteriorating.

An assessment of his presidency will take place later, in a few years. That requires some perspective. But the nature of political life is such that judgments are being made right now, in the heat of the moment.

According to this rule, Macron is to blame for everything today. According to Ipsos, only 15% of French people approve of his performance—the lowest level since 2017.

And this has a direct impact on the presidential candidates’ campaigns. Those who were in the opposition—in particular, Marine Le Pen, Jean-Luc Mélenchon, and Raphaël Glucksmann, go out of their way to emphasize their lack of involvement in the bleak past 10 years and promise a complete break from the incumbent president’s governing style.

The centrist candidates for the top job at the Élysée Palace—Édouard Philippe and Gabriel Attal—both served as prime ministers under Macron. And now they are both forced to defend themselves and promise political renewal, fully aware of the problem of trust.

What exactly will the French be voting for when they choose one candidate or another?

This will be the fourth presidential election of her career, and she has never been this close to victory. According to polls, her support in the first round has consistently remained above 30%, and even the scandal involving her closest and most trusted ally, Jordan Bardella—who, according to an investigation by Mediapart, made blatantly anti-Semitic remarks in his youth—has not shaken her standing.

Bardella is set to become prime minister if Marine Le Pen wins the election. At this point, he has the full support of the entire National Rally party, starting with its leader, and completely rejects the allegations. Nevertheless, it cannot be ruled out that the story is not yet over, that the revelations will continue, and that Marine Le Pen will have to make difficult decisions under pressure from the circumstances.

The main focus of her platform is a combination of right-wing positions on political issues (primarily, tightening immigration rules and combating all forms of crime through tough police measures) and populist promises on economic issues.

The key tenet of this plan is the assertion of a “national priority.” This should not be understood as U.S. President Donald Trump’s “America First,” since it is not about settling scores with neighbors or—despite criticism from Brussels—withdrawing from the EU or the eurozone. Nor, for that matter, is it about foreign policy projects with grandiose ambitions.

“National priority” is understood to mean tightening immigration regulations, refusing to participate in international aid programs (Le Pen, for example, has stated her intention to withdraw aid to Ukraine), as well as restricting the social rights of foreigners in France, particularly their right to benefits and public housing. There is nothing surprising about these plans, as Marine Le Pen has always been eager to discuss lowering the retirement age back to 60 or reducing the VAT rate by cutting costs associated with foreigners.

It’s fair to assume that the economic portion of the platform will be the true test of Le Pen’s presidential ambitions.

She discusses the enormous potential for budget savings through contributions to the EU budget and a revision of migration policy. However, there are concerns that these estimates are overly optimistic. The massive hole in France’s national budget did not arise on its own, but is linked to the persistent deficits in the pension and social security systems. Instead of implementing reforms in this area, Marine Le Pen proposes looking for money elsewhere, and perhaps some of her ideas will prove quite sound. But that does not make fundamental reforms any less necessary.

Another challenge she may face stems from institutional constraints, and it is no coincidence that she is eager to discuss proposed referendums, including constitutional amendments.

Meanwhile, it is already clear that the Senate and the Constitutional Council will take an independent stance and will not automatically agree to all of her proposals.

While in the opposition, Le Pen can easily talk about constitutional changes that would limit the influence of European institutions and create the legal framework for implementing her risky initiatives. It is quite another matter to travel to Brussels and present such ideas to the Council of Europe as president, fully aware of how crucial European support is for France—for example, in terms of the cost of servicing its external debt.

The contradictions in Marine Le Pen’s platform will not deter her loyal supporters, but they will give pause to that segment of the protest electorate that is willing and able to delve into the details. That is, unless substantive discussions give way to coverage of an ever-increasing number of protests marked by escalating levels of violence.

The 75-year-old politician has had a long career. In his youth, he was a Trotskyist, and later served as a minister in a Socialist government before founding the “Unbowed France” party in 2016.

This move proved to be a success: The French Socialist Party was in the midst of a deep crisis following François Hollande’s presidency, and the segment of society where left-wing sentiments prevailed was in need of new ideas and new faces.

Jean-Luc Mélenchon, like Marine Le Pen, built his political platform on sharp criticism of the elites and their inability to respond to the challenges of the times. Unlike the leader of the far right, Mélenchon, of course, lambasted the government from a left-wing perspective, positioning himself as a defender of the oppressed.

The key word in his platform can be considered “rupture”—that is, a break with the current form of capitalism, the excessive profits of the wealthy, existing budgetary principles, hidden discrimination, and, more broadly, the Fifth Republic.

It’s hard to take the feasibility of these ideas seriously, but they resonate with young people—both those from disadvantaged neighborhoods and those from universities. Young people always react strongly to the injustice they see around them, and the dramatic rhetoric of Mélenchon—who certainly possesses a certain charisma—is bearing political fruit.

Today, many public opinion polls show that he could advance to the second round of the presidential election, where he is guaranteed to lose to Marine Le Pen.

Mélanchon’s disapproval rating is at almost unattainable levels: more than 60% of French people say they would never vote for him. However, his lead over his centrist rivals is so narrow that any predictions on this matter are clearly premature.

Melenchon's situation is complicated by the fact that this time he faces a strong rival from the moderate left.

In the two previous presidential campaigns, he could have positioned himself as the sole candidate representing the entire left-wing movement—from socialists to communists—who had a chance of winning. But this time will be different.

Raphaël Glucksmann, the winner of the Social Democratic primaries, categorically rejects the idea of an alliance with Mélenchon and appears to be a very worthy contender. Thus, Mélenchon will not automatically receive all the votes from left-wing voters this time around.

In the political center, there is a significant difference in the situation facing the moderate right and the moderate left.

The latter have settled on a joint candidate for the primary—Rafael Glucksmann. According to polls, he will be able to join the race for the second round.

Despite the arbitrary nature of primaries, they have the undeniable advantage of conferring indisputable legitimacy on the winner among his or her constituency.

The center-right lacks such clarity. There are Édouard Philippe and Gabriel Attal, who served as prime minister at different times in Macron’s governments. There is Bruno Retailleau, who was minister of the interior and consistently emphasized his dissenting views on every issue. There is David Lisnar, the mayor of Cannes. He was not part of the government and has consistently criticized Macron’s policies from a right-liberal perspective.

In terms of their policy platforms, these candidates—who are not known for the kind of overt populism exhibited by Le Pen or Mélenchon—are striving to put forward responsible proposals aimed, above all, at balancing the budget and regaining control over the national debt.

It is clear that the path to achieving these goals lies in unpopular reforms—in particular, reforms to the pension and social insurance systems—as well as in reducing budget expenditures. The difficulty with this approach is that the French—many of whom are already experiencing a decline in their standard of living—are not enthusiastic about plans to revise their social rights, even if they understand the rationale behind them.

Especially since Marine Le Pen and Jean-Luc Mélenchon both promise to find the money elsewhere (from the wealthy, from foreigners, from corporations, etc.) without making things worse for citizens.

Another challenge facing moderate candidates is that they are part of the political establishment and, in that sense, share responsibility for the outcome of Macron’s nearly decade-long tenure.

The situation is worst for Philippe and Attal. Retayo and Lisnar emphasize their disagreement with the current president’s indecisiveness and inconsistency, yet they have long been members of the Republican Party and, in the public eye, are not much different from those of their colleagues who served directly in Macron’s governments.

Finally, Glucksmann has always been in the opposition and does not deserve such criticism, but he faces the difficult task of winning over the votes of Mélenchon’s supporters or voters with moderate right-wing views.

If you add up the support levels for all these candidates, the total comes to an impressive figure—more than 40 percent.

She argues that the political center in France still exists. But unfortunately, that kind of math doesn't add up. A Glucksmann voter would never vote for Retayo, and vice versa.

It's possible to imagine an alliance between Philippe and Attal in January or February, but an alliance with other contenders seems more problematic.

It is precisely in the split among the centrist forces that Mélenchon sees his chance to advance to the second round, but the real battle is still ahead.

This article was AI-translated and verified by a human editor